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Abstract
We study the decision of two rms within an oligopoly concerning
whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complemen-
tarities between their R&D activities and if so, whether to merge or
form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger
and motivated by real-world evidence, we incorporate a probability
that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We nd that a
horizontal agreement always arises in equilibrium, which is consistent
with empirical ndings that R&D complementarities between rms
positively inuence the formation of horizontal agreements. The in-
siders merger/RJV choice involves a trade-o: While merger oers
certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to
a prot-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where
competition is Cournot. Greater contract enforceability (quality) and
R&D investment costs both favour RJV. Interestingly, the insiders
may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforce-
able, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of
enforceability is negligible. We also explore the welfare implications
of the rms merger/RJV choice.
Keywords: horizontal merger, research joint venture (RJV), con-
tract enforceability, process R&D, R&D complementarity.
JEL numbers: O30, L13, D43
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1 Introduction
Within an industry, there are often complementarities between rival rms
R&D activities, in the sense that their research eorts are not perfect sub-
stitutes. For example, Kamien et al. (1992, p.1298) characterise the R&D
process as involving trial and error (it is a multidimensional heuristic rather
than a one-dimensional algorithmic process), with each rm simultaneously
pursuing several avenues of research, only some of which pay o. It is thus
natural that rms should seek to nd methods of exploiting such R&D com-
plementarities to their mutual benet.
Indeed, the empirical literature nds that R&D complementarities between
rms positively inuence the formation of horizontal agreements, such as
horizontal mergers and research joint ventures (RJVs). Gugler and Siebert
(2007), for example, nd that both mergers and RJVs in the semiconductor
industry are associated with substantial eciency gains, which they partly
attribute to the internalisation of positive R&D externalities. (See also An-
drade et al. (2001) on horizontal mergers, and Hernan et al. (2003) on RJVs.)
For a survey, which nds that exploiting complementarities is a major motive
for cooperation in R&D, see Veugelers (1998).
In this paper, we examine the choice between horizontal merger and RJV
in a setting where rms R&D investments are endogenous and R&D com-
plementarities exist across rms. In an RJV, the participating rms re-
main independent entities who maximise their own prots, whereas decisions
within a merged rm are taken to maximise joint prots. Competition policy
practitioners typically argue that an RJV is socially preferred to a horizon-
tal merger because, while both institutional structures facilitate the shar-
ing of R&D results and the exploitation of complementarities, an RJV has
the added virtue that it preserves product-market competition between the
participants. Thus, merger-specic synergies resulting from R&D comple-
mentarities are required to justify a merger (see, e.g., Farrell and Shapiro,
2001).
The model we present contains two ways in which the degree of R&D-
complementarity exploitation might dier between an RJV and a merger.
First, in contrast to the existing literature, we allow for the possibility that
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the RJV contract might fail to enforce R&D sharing by the insiders. This
is consistent with the empirical evidence, which \suggests that cooperation
carries a disturbingly high risk of failure" (Veugelers, 1998, p. 420). Second,
R&D investment levels, which are endogenously determined, might dier be-
tween RJV and merger { since the positive externality of one insider's R&D
eort on the other will be internalised only in the latter case.
It seems intuitively appealing that, relative to an RJV, a horizontal merger
might be more \eective" at inducing participating rms to pool their R&D
results. Within an RJV, rms, who remain independent, have a strong incen-
tive not to reveal all of their R&D results to their partners. RJVs attempt
to address this problem through the use of contracts that are signed when
RJVs are established, but such contracts might fail to be enforceable ex post
(i.e. after R&D results have been realised). Therefore, for the insiders, a hor-
izontal merger, which precommits them to pooling R&D outputs (through
the objective of joint prot maximisation), can be an attractive alternative
to forming an RJV { independently of market power considerations.
For example, in 2000, the Federal Trade Commission approved the merger
between BP (then called BP Amoco) and the Atlantic Richeld Company
(ARCO) partly on the grounds that, by committing the rms to sharing
their accumulated technical expertise, it would signicantly reduce extraction
costs at the Prudhoe Bay oil eld in Alaska. During the case, BP and ARCO
successfully argued that over twenty years of contractual experiments to gain
the benets of information pooling had failed (Farrell and Shapiro, 2001,
p. 705). Moreover, Holmstrom and Roberts (1998, pp. 90-91) discuss the
diculties faced by attempts to facilitate the sharing of knowledge between
competing rms, concluding that \knowledge transfers are a very common
driver of mergers and acquisitions". They discuss the corporate structures
of ABB, a large multinational in electrical equipment, and BP, and show
how, for both rms, integration is crucial to facilitating knowledge sharing
between their constituent business units.
R&D \veriability" { that is, observability by courts { is a crucial element
in our analysis. In advance of results emerging from the research lab, both
the quantitative and the qualitative nature of R&D output are typically
unknown. This makes it very tough to write an RJV contract that describes
R&D results across all possible states of the world suciently precisely to
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ensure that courts can always enforce its sharing rules.1 The incomplete
nature of RJV contracts means that there is always a chance that any given
contract, which commits the insiders to sharing certain dened R&D outputs,
will fail to be enforceable because the realised R&D results fall outside the
terms of the original contract. In our model, we capture the success/failure of
the RJV contract by assuming that it is enforceable with a certain probability,
which we term the \contract quality". Aside from the problem of contract
enforceability, the modelling of behaviour within RJVs is identical to the
\RJV competition" case of Kamien et al. (1992), where RJV insiders set
both their R&D and their output levels independently to maximise their
own prots.2
By contrast, a bilateral merger reduces the number of independent rms in
the industry by one, with the merged rm operating two R&D labs due to
the rising marginal cost of R&D. Thus, merging gives the insiders a size ad-
vantage on the product market relative to the outsiders, which is empirically
plausible.3
We model an oligopolistic industry, where rms compete both in process
R&D and, subsequently, in output, and focus on the decision of two rms
concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit R&D
complementarities and, if so, whether to merge or, form an RJV. Much of the
structure of the model is standard to facilitate straightforward comparisons
with existing results in the literature. The rms are initially identical, and the
product is homogeneous. Each rm has a constant unit cost, which decreases
in its own R&D investment.4 We assume \full" R&D complementarity, which
we take to mean: a given rm's R&D activity is as eective at reducing other
rms' marginal costs as it is at reducing its own.5 Aside from R&D sharing
within a merger/RJV, there are no (involuntary) inter-rm R&D spillovers.
Surprisingly, to the best of our knowledge, the \merger versus RJV" choice
has received no attention in the vast theoretical literature on the organisation
of R&D. This paper attempts to partially address this shortcoming. Existing
applied theory papers on horizontal mergers and RJVs have tended to analyse
the choice between a given type of horizontal agreement, either merger or
RJV, and no-agreement.6 Thus, the present paper, which focusses on the
merger/RJV choice, is a bridge between those two literatures.
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The paper also addresses a gap between the IO literature on RJVs (e.g.
Kamien et al., 1992), which typically assumes that RJV contracts are al-
ways enforceable (while we allow for \contract failure" within the RJV), and
that on incomplete contracts (especially Williamson, 1985), which often ab-
stracts from the eects of product-market competition by assuming bilateral
monopoly-type interactions between rms in unrelated (or vertically related)
markets. 7
A rst nding (in Section 4) is that, for the two insiders, the RJV always
dominates the no-agreement outcome. This implies that a horizontal agree-
ment, either merger or RJV, will always arise in equilibrium. With identical
rms, it is well established within the literature that industry prots are
maximised when all rms determine their R&D investments cooperatively,
and pool R&D results, but compete a la Cournot in outputs;8 this set-up is
termed RJV cartelization by Kamien et al. (1992). In contrast, our nding
relates to an RJV where R&D investments are determined non-cooperatively
and participation is limited to a subset of rms.9
Next, we invesigate the insiders' merger/RJV choice. The analysis here can
be related to that of Davidson and Ferrett (2007), who examine the insiders'
choice between horizontal merger and no-agreement within a similar model
(but with brand heterogeneity). Merger allows the exploitation of R&D
complementarities, but it provokes a prot-reducing output expansion by the
outsiders on the product market,where competition is Cournot.10 Therefore,
a protability trade-o between merger and no-agreement emerges: merger
internalises R&D complementarities but provokes a prot-reducing output
expansion by the outsiders.
The RJV resembles no-agreement in that, in both scenarios, all rms in the
industry make both their R&D and their production decisions independently
to maximise their own (expected) prots. However, unlike no-agreement,
the RJV does allow some probability that R&D complementarities will be
successfully exploited. This is what lies behind the nding, discussed above,
that the insiders always prefer RJV to no-agreement. It thus follows that the
size of the region in parameter space where merger dominates no-agreement
will be larger than that where merger dominates RJV.
The insiders' merger/RJV choice entails a trade-o: while merger oers a
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higher probability than RJV that R&D complementarities will be success-
fully exploited, it tends to be less protable, ceteris paribus,11 than RJV on
the product market. In product-market competition, merger suers in com-
parison with RJV for the same reason that it underperforms no-agreement:
the protability of merger is undermined by the reactions of outsiders. In
concentrated industries, an increase in competitive pressure (increased num-
ber of competing rms) undermines the \market power" gain from merger,
and it must therefore be oset by lower \contract quality" (which makes RJV
less attractive) to maintain indierence.
Finally, we derive two surprising and interesting results that relate to the
extremes of contract quality. First, we show that the insiders may optimally
choose to merge even when RJV contracts are \perfect" (i.e. always enforce-
able). We suggest that this is because the \prot externality" between the
insiders in R&D determination is internalised under HM { but not under
RJV. Secondly, on the contrary, we show that the insiders may optimally
choose to form an RJV even when the probability of contract enforceability
is negligible.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model, and Section 3 presents the equilibrium solutions for the three possible
R&D organization choices by the insiders: no-agreement, horizontal merger,
and RJV. Section 4 analyses the insiders' no-agreement/merge/RJV choice,
and presents a brief illustrative welfare analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model Setup
There are n (initially identical) rms producing a homogeneous good. Firm
i's quantity is denoted by qi and p is the good's price with the inverse demand
function being
p = 1 Q (1)
where Q =
nP
i=1
qi is industry output. Initially, each rm operates with the
same constant unit cost, c, with 0 < c < 1, and there are no xed costs.
There is no entry into the industry.
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For simplicity we consider a situation where two rms have two possible
means of exploiting synergies between their R&D activities: horizontal mer-
ger (HM) or research joint venture (RJV). We consider the following sequence
of moves: in stage 0, the choice between NA (no agreement), HM, and RJV
is made; in stage 1, all rms simultaneously choose how much to invest in
process R&D (cost reduction); and in stage 2, all rms compete a la Cournot
on the product market. We assume complete information, and we solve the
game backwards to isolate its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The stage 0 choice between NA, HM and RJV aects the insiders' costs and
their subsequent behaviour. The NA case, where the two rms remain in-
dependent, is the easiest to consider because all the rms in the industry
are symmetric. Firm i0s total cost of R&D is (=2)x2i , where  is a constant
capturing the diculty (or eciency) of R&D. Under NA, this R&D expen-
diture lowers a rm's unit cost to c xi, where xi represents R&D eort (cost
reduction).12
Under HM, the subsequent R&D and output decisions of the merged rm
are made to maximise joint prots. Horizontal merger guarantees that R&D
complementarities are fully exploited: the merged rm owns (two R&D labs
and) two plants with equal unit costs. The merged rm is therefore indierent
concerning how to divide its total output between its two plants.13
Assume, for simplicity, that rm 1 merges with rm n to become rm m.14
Denote the total cost reduction that the merged rm generates through R&D
(at both of its labs) by xm. Therefore, its unit cost is cm = c  xm. Because
the merged rm owns two R&D labs (and given decreasing returns to R&D),
it will optimally generate half of its total cost reduction at each lab (i.e. it
will divide its total R&D budget equally between its two labs). Therefore,
the merged rm (rm m) has a total R&D cost of 2
 

2
  
xm
2
2
=
 

4

x2m.
The remaining rms (outsiders) behave like the rms in the NA case.
For concreteness, suppose rms 1 and 2 form the RJV (although since all
rms are initially identical, this assumption is innocuous: it just eases the
expression of some of the expressions in the next section). For a given indus-
try cost vector, the Cournot equilibrium is the same as in the NA game.
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Under RJV, the participant rms (1 and 2) agree in a contract, signed before
R&D investments are decided, to share their R&D results before the start
of stage 2 (product market competition). However, after R&D results have
been realised, this contract turns out to be enforceable only with probability
!, which measures \contract quality". Thus, ! can also be interpreted as
the probability that R&D outputs are observable by courts, or \veriable".15
In a nutshell, the problem is that the RJV contract, written in advance of
R&D activity being undertaken, cannot exhaustively and precisely catalogue
R&D output in every possible state of the world. Such breadth of coverage is
necessary, however, because RJV insiders have a strong incentive not to share
their research outputs. We will sometimes refer to contract enforceability as
\RJV success" and to contract unenforceability as \RJV failure", and we
assume that RJV success/failure becomes common knowledge.
If, in the light of the insiders' R&D outputs, the RJV contract turns out
to be unenforceable (with probability 1   !), then the RJV insiders have a
dominant strategy not to share their R&D results (because they can do so
with impunity) and their unit cost functions in stage 2 are as under NA, e.g.
c1 = c   x1. Alternatively, if the RJV contract turns out to be enforceable,
then it will ensure that the insiders pool their R&D results and the insiders'
unit cost functions in stage 2 will be as under HM, e.g., c1 = c  x1   x2.
In the RJV scenario, all rms (both insiders and outsiders) make both their
R&D and their output choices independently to maximize their own expected
prots (outsiders, of course, have access only to their own R&D results),16
and all rms are risk neutral.
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3 Equilibrium Solutions
3.1 No agreement between rms (NA)
The prot of rm i is given by i = [p   (c   xi)]qi   2x2i : Stage 2 Cournot
competition yields the following output levels:
qi =
1 + c i   nci
1 + n
=
(1  c) + (n+ 1)xi  
Pn
j=1 xj
n+ 1
(2)
Q =
n Pn1 ci
1 + n
=
n(1  c) +Pnj=1 xj
n+ 1
where, as is usual, c i denotes the sum of the unit costs of rm i's rivals.
In stage 1, xi is set to maximise i = q
2
i  2x2i . Imposing symmetry (xi = xNA8i) on the resulting FOC and solving gives
xNA =
2n (1  c)
 (1 + n)2   2n (3)
as the equilibrium level of R&D output.17 Note that (i) dxNA=dn < 0 which
proves that a pairwise merger (a reduction in the number of rms, see below)
results in an increase in R&D and (ii) dxNA=d < 0. Eectively a merger
will reduce competition amongst rms and increases each rm's market share
leading to an increased incentive for cost-reducing R&D. The common equi-
librium level of prots, NA, can be found by substituting (3) into (2) and
using i = q
2
i   2x2i , which is:
NA =
(1  c)2 [(1 + n)2   2n2]
[(1 + n)2   2n]2 : (4)
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3.2 Horizontal merger (HM)
In stage 2 (output stage) we obtain the following values in Cournot equilib-
rium:
qi =
1 +
Pn 1
j=1 cj   nci
n
=
(1  c) + nxi  
Pn 1
j=1 xj
n
(5)
Q =
(n  1) Pn 1i=1 ci
n
=
(n  1)(1  c) +Pn 1j=1 xj
n
In the R&D stage, rm m chooses xm to maximise q
2
m   4x2m, subject to
cm = c   xm; and outsider j chooses xj to maximise q2j   2x2j , subject to
cj = c   xj. Imposing symmetry xj = xmo for all the outsiders on the
resulting FOCs, and solving,18 yields:
xm =
m2 (n  2 +m1)
m1 +m2 (n  2) (1  c)
xmo =
m2   1
m1 +m2 (n  2) (1  c)
where
m1 =
4 (n  1)  n2
2 (n  1)
m2 =
4 (n  1)
n2   4 (n  1)2 :
Therefore the merged rm's equilibrium prots under HM are
m =

1  c+ (n  1)xm   (n  2)xmo
n
2
  
4
x2m
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and upon substituting from above becomes
m =
(1  c)2 [n2(   4) + 8n  4)] [n(   2) + 2]2
[8  16n+ n3(   4) + 4n2(2 + )]2 : (6)
For the insider rms, HM will dominate NA if and only if
m > 2NA:
3.3 Research Joint Venture (RJV)
The RJV comprises rms 1 and 2. Unit costs depend on R&D investments
in stage 1 and also on whether the RJV succeeds or fails. Stage 2 under RJV
is qualitatively identical to stage 2 under NA; see (2) above. In stage 1 under
RJV, rm 1 chooses x1 to maximize expected prots:
in;1rjv = !
 
1  (n  1) (c  x1   x2) +
Pn
j=3(c  xj)
n+ 1
!2
+ (1  !)
 
1  n (c  x1) + (c  x2) +
Pn
j=3(c  xj)
n+ 1
!2
  
2
x21;
with an analogous expression holding for rm 2. An RJV outsider (here, rm
3) chooses x3 to maximise
out;3rjv = !
 
1 + 2 (c  x1   x2)  n (c  x3) +
Pn
j=4(c  xj)
n+ 1
!2
+ (1  !)
 
1 + (c  x1) + (c  x2)  n (c  x3) +
Pn
j=4(c  xj)
n+ 1
!2
  
2
x23
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with similar expressions holding for the remaining outsider rms. Imposing
symmetry (x1 = x2 = x
in
rjv and xj = x
out
rjv for all the outsiders) on the resulting
FOCs, and solving,19 we get:
xinrjv =
(n  2) r1   1
2 (1 + !) (n  2) r1 + r2 (1  c) (7)
xoutrjv =
[2 (1 + !) + r2] r1
2 (1 + !) (n  2) r1 + r2 (1  c) (8)
where
r1 =
2n
 (1 + n)2   6n
r2 =
2 (n  1) [n (1 + !)  2!]   (1 + n)2
2 (n  !) :
Therefore, we can express an RJV insider's equilibrium prots as:
inrjv = !

1  c+ 2 (n  1)xinrjv   (n  2)xoutrjv
1 + n
2
+ (1  !)

1  c+ (n  1)xinrjv   (n  2)xoutrjv
1 + n
2
  
2
(xinrjv)
2;
which, after the relevant subtitutions yields:
inrjv =
(1 c)2[n( 2)+]2[(1+n)2 2(n 1)2!][+2(! 1)!+n2( 2+2!)+2n( 2(! 1)!)]
f(1+n)[n( 2)+][(1+n)2 2n] 2(n 2)(n 1)[(1+n)2 2n]!+8n(n 2)!2g2 (9)
We can obtain a similar expression for the equilibrium prots for an RJV
outsider by substituting from (7) and (8).
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4 Analysis and Results
4.1 RJV dominates NA
For the insiders, RJV dominates NA in the sense that inrjv  NA for all
parameter values, with strict inequality if ! 6= 0. The following proposition
elaborates.
Proposition 1 The insiders strictly prefer participating in an RJV to No
Agreement, unless the RJV is guaranteed to fail. In particular: (i) for ! =
0;inrjv = NA, (ii) for ! = 1;
in
rjv > NA and (iii) for 0 < ! < 1;
in
rjv >
NA.
The proof of the proposition is in the Appendix. However, we provide here
an intuitive explanation: Note that if ! equals zero (i.e. the RJV contract
is guaranteed to fail), then the RJV game is identical to the NA game (this
explains part (i)). When ! is strictly positive, the RJV contract may prove
successful. Suppose, rst, that every rm's R&D level is xed at xNA and
that only outputs can be varied. If, in this situation, two rms enter into
a contract to pool their R&D stocks (as in an RJV), then their marginal
costs will fall with probability ! and their expected prots will rise as, if
the RJV succeeds, they expand on the product market at the expense of the
n  2 outsiders. Next, allow R&D levels to vary. The rise in insider output
just described increases the \marginal benet" (or marginal variable prot)
to an insider since cost reductions are now spread over a larger quantity
of production. Hence, both insider R&D investment and insider prots rise.
The response of outsiders to higher R&D investment by the rms in the RJV
is to retrench: they are squeezed on the product market, and cut their R&D
levels. In turn, this reaction by the outsiders benets the insiders. It is clear
that ceteris paribus (specically, holding the R&D levels of outsiders xed)
the insiders would benet from the move from NA to RJV. Our argument has
sought to show that the reaction of outsiders { specically, the fact that they
cut R&D investment in response to being squeezed on the product market
following the formation of an RJV { is also benecial to the insiders.
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Finally, note that we have assumed that rms' non-R&D xed costs are in-
dependent of the NA/HM/RJV choice. However, this might not be the case.
If, for example, there were even an innitesimal xed cost of implementing
a horizontal agreement (either RJV or HM), then NA would dominate RJV
if ! is suciently small.
On the contrary, of course, both RJV and (especially) HM might present
opportunities for savings in non-R&D xed costs through the avoidance of
duplication (e.g. the sharing of \back oce" facilities) and \synergies". Such
savings are a further reason for dropping NA from the equilibrium analysis.
4.2 HM versus RJV: the central trade-o
The result of Proposition 1 that RJV is always more protable for the insiders
than NA greatly simplies the analysis by allowing us to drop the NA case.
The equilibrium choice is now between HM and RJV.
In the present model, RJV resembles NA in that, in both scenarios, all rms
in the industry make both their R&D and their production decisions in-
dependently to maximise their own (expected) prots. However, unlike NA,
RJV does allow some probability, !, that R&D complementarities will be ex-
ploited. This is what lies behind the result in Proposition 1 that the insiders
always prefer RJV to NA. To fully explore the choice of horizontal agreement
we proceed by examining the prot dierence m   2inrjv  mr. As is
often the case in models of multi-stage competition such as the present one,
the complexity of the equilibrium solutions means that an analytical proof is,
unfortunately, beyond reach. However, we have obtained numerical solutions
and results that are robust to changes in the relevant parameter values.20 In
the numerical results we present we have set c = 0:3; varying c does not
change the results in any qualitative manner as it is just a scaling parame-
ter. However, we do vary the remaining parameters of the model, namely n
(the number of rms), ! (the contract quality) and  (eciency/diculty of
R&D, where  > 4 so as to satisfy all relevant second-order conditions).
Figure 1 depicts the choice between HM and RJV, and the way in which
the intensity of market competition as captured by the number of rms in
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Figure 1: The insiders' choice between HM and RJV
Figure 1 goes here
the market, n; may be traded o against contract quality, !, to maintain
indierence on the part of the insiders.21 The line in Figure 1 is the \indif-
ference locus" such that m   2inrjv = 0 (or mr = 0); above the line the
insiders' preferred horizontal agreement is RJV (mr < 0) and below it is
HM (mr > 0).
There is `perfect' R&D complementarity in our model, in the sense that
there is zero duplication between the insiders' R&D activities, so that within
a successful RJV a given rms R&D investment reduces both insiders unit
costs by the same amount. Figure 1 highlights that, even with such `perfect'
complementarity, it is still possible for the insiders to prefer RJV to HM
despite ! < 1.
Note that for small n, i.e., concentrated industries, our primary focus, the
`indierence locus' is downward sloping. Intuitively, we justify this as follows:
a higher number of competing rms undermines the `market power' gain
associated with merging, and it must therefore be oset by a lower ! (which
makes the RJV less attractive) to maintain indierence. However, for quite
large n and low  the `indierence locus' is not downard sloping (e.g.,  = 4
and n  8) but is essentially at over the relevant range. Interestingly, we
nd that HM can dominate RJV even if contracts are perfect (! = 1), e.g.,
the point (3,1) lies beneath the indierence locus for  = 4. In this case
R&D is relatively easy, making the `prot externality' between the insiders
in R&D setting quite large: hence, HM (which internalises that externality)
is preferred by the insiders to RJV (which doesn't). Surprisingly, RJV can
dominate HM even if its chance of success is negligible (! close to zero), e.g.,
the point (5,0) is above the indierence locus for  = 7. In this case R&D is
relatively dicult and coupled with the strong product-market interactions
makes HM unprotable.
Figure 2 conveys a similar message to Figure 1 by showing the equivalent
prot surfaces (HM and RJV): (i) a rise in n undermines the `market power'
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Prots
Figure 2 goes here
gain of the merger and (ii) more costly R&D (a rise in ) makes RJV more
protable. Intuitively, relative to RJV, the gain from merging is that R&D
will denitely be shared, whereas the cost from merging is the reaction of out-
siders on the product market (as in Salant et al. (1983)). When  rises, then
equilibrium R&D levels fall, so the gain from merging (rather than forming
an RJV) is smaller { but there is still a Salant-type cost from merging.
4.3 Social Welfare
In this section we briey explore the normative properties of the model. As
usual, welfare is expressed as gross surplus less total costs (production and
R&D costs),
W =
Z Q
0
p  dQ 
nX
i=1
ciqi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i
=Q  1
2
Q2  
nX
i=11
ciqi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i (10)
where where Q Pni=1 qi, and i indexes plants.22
In the NA equilibrium, where all rms are identical, (10) after the necessary
substitutions yields:
WNA =
(1  c)2n [(1 + n)2(2 + n)   4n2]
2 [(1 + n)2   2n]2 : (11)
In HM, applying (10) and accounting for the asymmetry between insiders
and outsiders results in:
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Wm = 2qm(1  c+ xm) + (n  2)qmo(1  c+ xmo)
 1
2
[2qm + (n  2)qmo]2   
2
[x2m + (n  2)x2mo];
which after the relevant substitutions and some manipulations results in the
following expression for equilibrium social welfare:
Wm =
(1 c)2(n 1)[n4(1+n)3 8n3(n2 2)2+4n(n(29 25n+4n3) 8) 32(n 1)3(n2 2)]
[2(8+n(n(8+(4+n( 4))) 16)]2 : (12)
In the case of the RJV, quantities (and prots) depend on whether the RJV
is successful or not. Using (10) we obtain:
Wrjv = !
2qinrjv;s
 
1  c+ 2xinrjv

+ (n  2) qoutrjv;s
 
1  c+ xoutrjv
  1
2

2qinrjv;s + (n  2) qoutrjv;s
2
+ (1  !) 
2qinrjv;f
 
1  c+ xinrjv

+ (n  2) qoutrjv;f
 
1  c+ xoutrjv
  1
2

2qinrjv;f + (n  2) qoutrjv;f
2
  
2

2(xinrjv)
2 + (n  2) (xoutrjv)2

where, qinrjv;s and q
out
rjv;s are quantities if the RJV succeeds (s):
qinrjv;s =
(1  c) + 2 (n  1)xinrjv   (n  2)xoutrjv
1 + n
qoutrjv;s =
(1  c)  4xinrjv + 3xoutrjv
1 + n
and qinrjv;f and q
out
rjv;f are quantities if the RJV fails (f):
qinrjv;f =
(1  c) + (n  1)xinrjv   (n  2)xoutrjv
1 + n
qoutrjv;f =
(1  c)  2xinrjv + 3xoutrjv
1 + n
:
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Welfare
Figure 3 goes here
Figure 4: Social preference between HM and RJV
Figure 4 goes here
The explicit expression for Wrjv is given in the appendix.
Our rst nding is that, socially, RJV always dominates NA (see Figure 3);
that is, Wrjv > WNA for every set of parameter values. This nding is analo-
gous to the result we derived in section 4.1 above on the ranking of insiders'
prots, and it is unsurprising because an RJV allows R&D complementar-
ities to be exploited without reducing the number of independent rms on
the product market.
Next, we compare the social welfare performance of RJV and HM (con-
sider Figures 3 and 4). A rise in ! increases the relative attractiveness of
RJV for given ; as  increases the relative attractiveness of RJV becomes
more prevalent, Wrjv > Wm. This conforms to a standard view amongst
competition-policy practitioners: RJV is to be socially preferred to hori-
zontal merger because it preserves product-market competition.23 However,
there are always areas where HM is preferred, this occurs typically for lower
!. One interpretation of this result is that poor contract quality makes the
gains from a horizontal agreement \merger-specic"(in the sense of Farrell
and Shapiro,2001).
Figure 4 depicts the social preference between HM and RJV, and the way
in which the intensity of market competition as captured by the number
of rms in the market, n; may be traded o against contract quality, !,
to maintain indierence on the part of society. The line in Figure 4 is the
\social indierence locus" such that Wm  Wrjv = 0 (or Wmr = 0); above
the line society prefers RJV (Wmr < 0) and below it society prefers HM
(Wmr > 0). Often, but not always, the `social indierence loci' are downard
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sloping. We nd that, from a social perspective, an increase in n favours RJV
over HM. Given this, the negative slopes in Figure 4 are not surprising: the
rise in n (which favours RJV) must be oset by a fall in ! (which favours
HM).
Figure 5: HM/RJV preferences of insiders and society
Figure 5 goes here
Finally, we compare the private incentives of the insiders with the social
preference between HM and RJV (see Figure 5). The graphs in Figure 5
compare, for three dierent values of , the HM/RJV preferences of the
insiders versus society. When  is small ( = 4), we can unambiguously
(i.e. for all n) say that the insiders preference for merger is stronger than
society's. This is indicated by the shaded area where there is a conict
between insiders, preferring HM, and society, preferring RJV (type A conict:
HM occurs too often). This doesn't seem surprising: for example, ceteris
paribus (which includes cost reductions), we expect consumers to prefer RJV
to HM. Results are more complicated for larger  ( = 5:5 and 7). Here,
the relevant indierence loci cross, so that for small n the insiders are too
likely to merge (from a social perspective), whereas for large n they are not
likely enough to merge (type B conict: RJV occurs too often). There is a
divergence in incentives here - desirability preferences dier. In all cases, the
areas of conict point to the potential for policy intervention in the direction
of establishing the outcome most preferred by society.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
Empirical research suggests that R&D complementarities between rms posi-
tively inuence the formation of horizontal agreements. The key contribution
of this paper is to examine the choice between horizontal merger and RJV as
alternative vehicles for exploiting R&D complementarities, whereas most ex-
isting contributions examine just one of those forms of horizontal agreement
in isolation. Moreover, an innovation in our modelling structure is that we
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allow for the possibility that RJV contracts might be unenforceable, which
is motivated by real-world evidence that suggests that cooperation [between
rms] carries a disturbingly high risk of failure (Veugelers, 1998, p. 420).
Our key ndings are summarised as follows:
1. For the two insiders, RJV always dominates no-agreement, so some
form of horizontal agreement (merger or RJV) always arises in equilib-
rium. This is consistent with the empirical ndings that the presence
of R&D complementarities promotes the formation of horizontal agree-
ments.
2. Merger/RJV tradeo: While merger oers certainty that R&D com-
plementarities will be successfully exploited, it leads to an aggressive
and prot-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market. Rises
in contract quality and R&D costs favour RJV over merger.
3. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV con-
tracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even
when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible.
4. The welfare results (where we compare the HM/RJV preference of the
insiders and society) indicate that there are cases where the insiders
choose to merge too often from a social point of view; however, we also
found cases where the insiders choose RJV when society prefers merger.
The former result is consistent with conventional wisdom amongst com-
petition policy practitioners, whereas the latter nding, which arises
because poor contract quality in the RJV makes the gains from a hor-
izontal agreement merger-specic, challenges it.
To close, we briey consider possible generalisations of our analysis.
The rst avenue for generalisation involves considering additional vehicles for
exploiting R&D complementarities. Given that the insiders intend to pool
their R&D results, there are, in principle, four distinct ways in which they
could manage their R&D and output decisions. Our analysis has considered
two of these: RJV, where the insiders choose their R&D and production
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levels independently of each other to maximise their own prots; and hor-
izontal merger, where the R&D and output decisions of inside brands are
co-ordinated to maximise joint prots.
However, there are two other potential set-ups that the insiders could adopt.
The rst involves collusion in R&D but competition in outputs. Kamien et
al. (1992) refer to this as \RJV cartelization", and it might conceivably be
achieved in two ways: the RJV insiders could contract all of their R&D activ-
ities out to a third party with instructions to maximise joint prots; or they
could merge and implement \divisionalization" (in the sense of Baye et al.,
1996) on the product market. For our purposes, it is important to note that
both of these approaches might well involve their own signicant contractual
problems.24 However, setting these to one side, we conjecture that such \RJV
cartelization", if successfully implemented, would always dominate our RJV
option. Secondly, the insiders might compete in R&D but collude in outputs
{ the \semi-collusion" case of Fershtman and Gandal (1994), and Brod and
Shivakumar (1999). In the Cournot setting, where mergers for market-power
reasons alone are generally unprotable, we conjecture that the insiders will
prefer our RJV option to such \semi-collusion".
Secondly, we could allow for endogenous RJV and merger size, rather than re-
stricting horizontal agreements to just two participants. In comparison with
the no-agreement outcome, where all rms remain independent, it seems
likely that, if legally permitted, an RJV would expand to include the entire
industry. However, it is unclear whether the same is true of a horizontal
merger of variable size (because merger tends to make the insiders less ag-
gressive on the product market, which benets outsiders). Thus, it is possible
that the optimal RJV and the optimal merger would include dierent num-
bers of insiders.
The systematic investigation of these conjectures remains a task for future
work.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof of the proposition proceeds in three parts.
(i) Setting ! = 0; in the expression for prot of an RJV insider (9) results in
inrjv = NA. (ii) When ! = 1, from (9) we obtain
inrjv =
(1  c)2 [n(   2) + ]2 [(1 + n)2   2(n  1)2]
[8(n  1)n  2(2 + n+ n2 + 2n3) + (1 + n)32]2 :
The prot dierence inrjv   NA can be written explicitly as follows:
inrjv   NA =
2(1  c)2f1(n; )
1
/ f1(n; ) > 0
where 1  [(1 + n)53   4(1 + n)3(1 + n)22 + 4n2(1 + n)(4n  1)   16(n  1)n2]2 > 0:
It can be shown (although tedious) that f1(n; ) > 0:
25 (iii) For 0 < ! < 1,
from (4) and (9) we obtain:
inrjv   NA =
2(1  c)2f2(n; ; !)
2
/ f2(n; ; !) > 0
where 2  [(1 + n)2   2n]2 [(1 + n)( + n(2  ))((1 + n)2   2n)
  2(n   2)(n   1)((1 + n)2   2n)! + 8n(n   2)!2]2. It can be shown by
plotting on a ne grid that f2(n; ; !) > 0:
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Furthermore, notice that lim!!0+ @@! (
in
rjv   NA) = lim!!0+ @@!inrjv (as
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@
@!
NA = 0). From (9) and after some manipulation, we obtain
lim!!0+ @@!
in
rjv /  2( 1 + n)2n3   n(1 + n) ( 2 + 5n+ n3)  + (1 + n)3(1 + ( 1 + n)n)2 > 0
Therefore, inrjv   NA is non-negative.
B Equilibrium expression for Wrjv
The equilibrium expression for Wrjv, after the relevant substitutions is:
Wrjv =
 
(1  c)2  n(1 + n)2(n(   2) + )2  (1 + n)2(2 + n)   4n2  4(n( 2 + ) + )
+
 
8n3
  2 + n2+ 4n   2 + n+ 5n2 + 5n3 + 2n4   n5 
+ (1 + n)3(4 + n( 2 + ( 3 + n)n(2 + n)))2!
+ 4
  16n2   2 + n2( 4 + n(2 + n))
  4n  8 + n  10 + n  16 + n  12 + n  8n2 + n3 
+ (1 + n)2
 
8 + n
 
16 + n
 
28 + n
 
10 + n  4n2 + n3 2
  2(1 + n)4(3 + n)3!2   16   4n2( 3 + 2n)  2 + n2
+ 2n( 8 + n( 8 + n( 3 + n(7 + ( 1 + n)n))))
  (1 + n)2( 2 + n( 4 + n(2 + n)))2!3
+ 64( 2 + n)n(( 2 + n)n+ )!4
=
 
2
 
(1 + n)(n(   2) + )  (1 + n)2   2n 
2(n  2)(n  1)  (1 + n)2   2n! + 8(n  2)n!22
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Notes
1To illustrate why precision is necessary in the RJV contract, consider an RJV relating
to a single product, X, where one of the RJV members is a multiproduct rm with a single
R&D lab for all of its lines of business. Clearly, the multiproduct rm would challenge an
RJV contract that simply stated \share all R&D related to X " by claiming that any given
piece of its R&D output related to another product and so need not be disclosed within
the RJV. Breadth is necessary in the RJV contract because, even if it perfectly describes
previous R&D output, the participating rms have incentives to target potentially non-
veriable R&D activities.
2In the Conclusion, we discuss how this choice of modelling RJVs relates to Kamien
et al.'s other case of \RJV cartelization" (i.e. co-operation between RJV insiders in the
setting of R&D but competition in outputs).
3In contrast, in the "simple" bilateral merger case where the merged rm runs a single
R&D lab, all rms are symmetric in the post-merger equilibrium; such a "simple" merger
is protable in a small region of parameter space (Matshusima et al. (2013)).
4With a homogeneous good and constant marginal (production) costs, Cournot com-
petition seems much better suited than Bertrand to analysing R&D investments across
multiple, competing rms. Moving to Bertrand competition would imply that at most
one rm within the industry would make strictly positive variable prots in equilibrium.
Therefore, only one rm would be prepared to make xed-cost investments in process
R&D.
5In the working-paper version (available from the authors on request), we allow for
both product dierentiation and a variable degree of R&D complementarity.
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6Key papers on the choice between horizontal merger and no-agreement are Salant et
al. (1983), and Deneckere and Davidson (1985). Davidson and Ferrett (2007) examine the
merger/no-agreement choice in the presence of endogenous R&D investments, as do Cabo-
lis et al. (2008) and Matsushima et al. (2013). For RJV/no-agreement comparisons, see,
d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), and Leahy
and Neary (1997). Several papers analyse merger/acquisition decisions with endogenous
R&D but no RJV option. Bartolini (2011), Friberg et al. (2012) and Phillips and Zhdanov
(2012) all have R&D decided before merger, whereas in Bertrand et al. (2012) the merger
decision precedes R&D determination.
7There is a parallel between our modelling and Williamson's (1985) \transaction cost"
theorising on rm boundaries. Williamson (1985) assumes that integration, which gives
one party formal control over both sides of a transaction, has an easier time resolving
potential disputes than does a market/contracting relationship.
8 e.g., Kamien et al., 1992 (see theorem 1), Roller et al., 2007, p. 1128.
9In this sense it extends the results of Poyago-Theotoky (1995) in the context of R&D
complementarities.
10Outsiders expand their production in response to the insiders' attempts to restrict
output and reach the monopoly solution. This works to undermine the protability of
horizontal mergers under Cournot competition, as highlighted by Salant et al. (1983).
11i.e. for a given vector of marginal costs across all rms.
12There are no inter-rm spillovers from R&D. Essentially, we are concerned with cases
where intra-rm R&D spillovers (within a horizontal agreement) are signicantly greater
than inter-rm R&D spillovers. Introducing inter-rm spillovers would complicate the
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analysis considerably and would dampen the main focus of the paper, which is the choice
of cooperation form under the stark assumption of no spillovers so as to isolate the main
drivers of this choice.
13Note that the assumption that the merged rm operates two R&D labs is essential to
have meaningful \R&D pooling" within the merged rm. If the merged rm operated just
one R&D lab, then the equilibrium under HM would be identical to that under NA with
n  1 rms.
14This merely makes the summations below easier to express. Often, we will refer to
rm m as rm 1.
15Note that we are assuming, for simplicity, that the R&D outputs of both insiders
always have the same veriability/non-veriability status. Thus, it is impossible, for
example, for rm 1's R&D output to be veriable (and its contractual commitment to
share R&D therefore to be enforceable) while rm 2's is not.
16In terms of the Kamien et al. (1992) taxonomy, this corresponds to the case of \RJV
competition". Having the RJV insiders compete both in R&D investments and in outputs
also nicely captures the institutional fact that, in an RJV, the insiders remain independent
rms (unlike following a horizontal merger).
17The second-order condition requires that  > 2n2=(n + 1)2, which is sucient for
 > 2 and any n.
18Firm m's second-order condition is  > 4
 
n 1
n
2
, and an outsider's is  > 2
 
n 1
n
2
.
The former is stricter and is sucient for  > 4 and any n.
19The second-order condition for an RJV rm is  > 2!

n 1
n+1
2
+2(1 !)

n
n+1
2
, and
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for an outsider  > 2

n
n+1
2
. The former is decreasing in !, whence it coincides with
the outsiders' condition. It is therefore sucient for  > 2 and any n for both to hold.
Note that a sucient condition for the relevant second-order conditions to hold across all
regimes is  > 4; in what follows we impose this restriction on .
20Full numerical calculations (using Mathematica 8.0) are available from the authors
upon request.
21As HM always dominates RJV when n = 2 (merger to monopoly) the graphs are
drawn starting at n = 3.
22The plant/rm distinction is important in the HM game.
23 There is, of course, a debate, into which we do not enter here, concerning the welfare
standard that is used in practice in competition policy (e.g., social welfare, consumer
surplus, or some mix of the two).
24For example, if the RJV insiders contract out their R&D work, then the third party
will require ongoing access to their accumulated R&D stocks and technical expertise (see
Bhattacharya et al. (1992) for an early analysis). This could well present similar contrac-
tual complications to those we analyse. The key point (and the key contrast with merger)
is that, within an RJV, rms remain independent entities whose ultimate concern is with
their own prots.
25f1(n; ) =
48(n  1)2n4   8n2(1 + n)  4 + n   16 + n  13  9n+ 6n2  +
4n(1 + n)2( 8 + n(2 + n( 6 + n(4 + n(2 + 3n)))))2  
2(1 + n)4(4 + n( 12 + n(13 + n( 8 + 5n))))3 + (1 + n)6(3 + 2( 2 + n)n)4 > 0:
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26f2(n; ; !) =
2
 
2n( 1 + ) +  + n22  3 + 3n3 + n6( 2 + )2(1 + ) + 2n3  2  5 + 2+
n2
  4  5 + 32+ n4  4 + 12   82 + 33+ n5   8 + 4   62 + 33! + 
( 6 + )4   4n102  2  3 + 2+ 2n3  8  6 + 32+ 4n2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